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Summary
In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Its application was taken up by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1995, the successor organization of the GATT.  Russia’s
application has entered into its most significant phase as Russia negotiates with WTO
members on the conditions for accession. 
Accession to the WTO is critical to Russia and its political leadership.  President
Vladimir Putin has made it a top priority.  He views accession as an important step
in integrating the Russian economy with the rest of the world and in fostering
economic growth and development by attracting foreign investment and by lowering
trade barriers.  For the United States, the European Union (EU) and other trading
partners, Russia’s accession to the WTO could increase stability and predictability
in Russia’s foreign trade and investment regime.  
   The Russian accession process is moving forward, but differences over some
critical issues remain, making the time for Russian accession to the WTO uncertain.
The European Union and the United States have raised concerns about Russian
energy pricing policies which allow natural gas, oil, and electricity to be sold
domestically far below world prices providing, they argue, a subsidy to domestic
producers of fertilizers, steel, and other energy-intensive goods. Russia counters that
the subsidies are not illegal under the WTO.  Concerns regarding Russian trade
barriers in the services sector, high tariffs for civil aircraft and autos, and intellectual
property rights have slowed down the process and made the original target of
completion in 2003 unattainable.  There are indications that Russia and its trading
partners, including the United States, would like to see the process completed by the
time of the G-8 meeting in St.  Petersburg which Russian President Putin will chair.
Congressional interest in Russia’s accession to the WTO is multifaceted.
Members of Congress are concerned that Russia enters the WTO under terms and
conditions in line with U.S. economic interests, especially gaining access to Russian
markets as well as safeguards to protect U.S. import-sensitive industries.  Some
Members also assert that Congress should have a formal role in approving the
conditions under which Russia accedes to the WTO, a role it does not have at this
time.  The Congress has a direct role in determining whether Russia receives
permanent normal trade relations (NTR) status which has implications for Russia’s
membership in the WTO and U.S.-Russian trade relations.  Without granting PNTR
to Russia, the United States would not benefit from the concessions that Russia
makes upon accession.  Issues regarding Russia’s accession to the WTO may arise
during the second session of the 109th Congress.  This report will be updated as
events warrant.
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Russia’s Accession to the WTO
In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Its application was taken up by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1995, the successor organization of the GATT.1  Russia’s
application has entered into its most significant phase as Russia negotiates with WTO
members on the conditions for  accession.  The process is moving forward, but
differences over some critical issues remain, making the time for Russian accession
to the WTO uncertain.
 
Accession to the WTO is critical to Russia and its political leadership.  President
Vladimir Putin has made it a top priority.  He views accession as an important step
in integrating the Russian economy with the rest of the world and in fostering
economic growth and development by attracting foreign investment and by lowering
trade barriers.  For the United States, the European Union (EU) and other trading
partners, Russia’s accession to the WTO could increase stability and predictability
in Russia’s foreign trade and investment regime.  Presidents Bush and Putin have
discussed Russia’s accession to the WTO at their various bilateral meetings.  At a
September 2005 meeting in Washington, President Bush told the Russian leader that
he was “very interested” in seeing Russia’s negotiations for WTO accession
completed by the end of the year.2  The fact that this goal was not accomplished
indicates problems in the negotiations.    
Congressional interest in Russia’s accession to the WTO is multifaceted.
Members of Congress are concerned that Russia enters the WTO under terms and
conditions in line with U.S. economic interests, especially gaining access to Russian
markets as well as safeguards to protect U.S. import-sensitive industries.  Some
Members also assert that Congress should have a formal role in approving the
conditions under which Russia accedes to the WTO, a role it does not have at this
time.   The Congress has a direct role in determining whether Russia receive
permanent normal trade relations (NTR) status which has implications for Russia’s
membership in the WTO and U.S.-Russian trade relations.  Without granting PNTR
to Russia, the United States would not benefit from the concessions that Russia
makes upon accession.  
This report examines the issue of Russia’s accession to the WTO, focusing on
the implications for Russia, the United States, and the WTO.  It begins with a short
overview of the WTO accession process and reviews the history of the Soviet
Union’s  relationship with the GATT/WTO.  It provides a brief discussion of
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Russian economic conditions and the status of economic reforms as they are a major
impetus for Russia’s application to join the WTO. The focus of the report is the
status of Russia’s accession application and the outstanding issues. The report
concludes with an analysis of the implications of Russia’s accession to the WTO for
Russia, the United States, the other WTO  members and for the WTO itself and an
analysis of the outlook for the Russia’s application.   This report will be updated as
events warrant.
The WTO and the Accession Process
The WTO’s membership of close to 150 countries and customs areas spans all
levels of economic development, from the least developed to the most highly
developed economies.  The WTO came into existence in January 1995 as a part of
the agreements reached by the signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations.  The WTO’s primary
purpose is to administer the roughly 60 agreements and separate commitments made
by its members as part of the GATT (for trade in goods), the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS — for trade in services), and the agreement on trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS). 
 The membership in the GATT/WTO  has grown exponentially.  The GATT was
originally founded in 1947 by 23 countries, and the WTO now has 148 members.
Among the most recent entrants are China and Taiwan, which joined on December
11, 2001, and January 1, 2002, respectively, Armenia which joined on February 5,
2003, and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, who joined on April 4,
2003.   Membership in the WTO commits its members to fundamental principles in
trade with other members, including:
! Most-favored nation treatment (MFN): The imports of goods and
services originating from one member country will be treated no less
favorably than imports of goods and services from any other member
country.  MFN is to be unconditional. In practical terms, this means
that in most cases a country cannot apply a higher import tariff to a
good from one member country than it applies to like goods from
any other member country.   
! National treatment:  Imports of goods and services are treated no
less favorably than like goods and services produced domestically.
In practical terms this means that governments cannot discriminate
against imports in the application of laws and regulations, such as
regulations to protect consumer safety or the environment.
! Transparency:  Government laws and regulations that affect
foreign trade and investment are to be published and available for
anyone to see.  Procedures to  implement the laws and regulations
are to be open.
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! Lowering Trade Barriers Through Negotiations:   Since the
GATT’s  creation, its members have conducted eights rounds of
negotiations to lower trade barriers.  At first these negotiations
focused on lowering tariffs.  But over time, the rounds have
broadened GATT/WTO coverage to include  nontariff barriers, such
as discriminatory government procurement practices, discriminatory
standards, and trade-distorting  government subsidies.   The last
completed round, the Uruguay Round (1986-94), resulted in the
most ambitious expansion of rules to cover, for the first time, trade
in agricultural products and services and government policies and
practices pertaining to intellectual property rights protection and
foreign investment regulations that affect trade.  
! Reliance on tariffs: In order to promote predictability and openness
in commerce, the WTO requires member countries to use tariffs and
avoid using quotas or other nontariff measures when restricting
imports for legitimate purposes, such as on injurious imports.
  
As part of its function to administer the rules established under the agreements,
the WTO provides a mechanism for the settlement of disputes between members
where the dispute involves alleged violations of WTO agreements.  Moreover, each
member’s trade regime is reviewed by the WTO Secretariat from time-to-time to
ensure that it conforms to WTO rules.  Trade among WTO members accounts for
about 90% of total world trade. 3 
       The collapse of the Soviet Union and its East European Bloc and  the movement
of many developing countries toward liberal trade policies have spurred interest in
joining the WTO.  Article XII of the agreement that established the WTO sets out the
requirements and procedures for countries to “accede.”  “Any state or customs
territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies is eligible to accede
to the WTO on terms agreed between it and WTO members.”   
The accession process begins with a letter from the applicant to the WTO
requesting membership.  The WTO General Council, the governing body of the
WTO when the  Ministerial Conference is not meeting, forms a Working Party (WP)
to consider the application.  Membership on the WP is open to any interested
member-country.    More than sixty member countries, including the United States,
are part of the WP.  The U.S. delegation is led by the Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for WTO and Multilateral Affairs and includes representatives from
the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Agriculture.   
The applicant submits a memorandum to the WP that describes in detail its
current trade regime.  The applicant and the WP then negotiate to determine what
legislative and structural changes the applicant must make to meet WTO
requirements and to establish the terms and conditions for entry of the applicant into
the WTO.    The WP’s findings are then included in a “Report of the Working Party”
and are the basis for drawing up the “Protocol of Accession.”
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While it negotiates with the WP, the applicant must also conduct bilateral
negotiations with each interested WTO member.  During these negotiations the WTO
member indicates what concessions and commitments  on trade in goods and services
it expects the applicant to make in order to gain entry, and the applicant indicates
what concessions and commitments it is willing to make until the two agree and set
down the terms.  The terms of the bilateral agreements are combined into one
document which  will apply on an MFN basis to all WTO members once the
applicant has joined the WTO.  The accession package is conveyed to the General
Council or Ministerial Conference for approval.  
Article XII does not establish a deadline for the process.  The length of the
process depends on a number of factors:  how many legislative and structural changes
an applicant must make in its trade regime in order to meet the demands of the WP,
how quickly its national and sub- national legislatures can make those changes, and
the demands on the applicant made by members in bilateral negotiations and the
willingness of the applicant to accept those demands.  Because WTO accession is a
political process as well as a legal process, its success depends on the political will
of all sides — the WTO member countries and  the applicant country.  A formal vote
is taken in the WTO that requires a 2/3 majority for accession, although in practice
the WTO has sought to gain a consensus on each application.  The process can take
a long time:  China’s application took over 15 years. 
The Soviet Union and the GATT/WTO
The Soviet Union was not invited to become a contracting-party of the GATT
in 1947 after it declined to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank — the other two multilateral organizations that resulted from the Bretton
Woods conference immediately following the end of World War II.   In fact, Soviet
trade and economic policy conflicted with the principles of the GATT.  The GATT
was based on removing barriers to trade and on developing economic
interdependence among countries.   Soviet foreign economic policy was largely based
on the concept of self-sufficiency — the domestic economy would produce as much
as possible for itself and import only those products which it could not produce.
Exports were used merely to buy necessary imports, not to build markets.  These
economic policies helped to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The Soviet
Union modified the concept of self-sufficiency to include members of the Soviet
Bloc- the East European countries, some Asian communist countries and Cuba,
confining most of its trade with these countries in a system of limited international
division of labor.  Only a small amount of trade was conducted outside the Bloc.  The
Soviet Union spearheaded the formation of  the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), what could be loosely described as the Soviet Bloc’s version of
the GATT.  
In  August 1986, the Soviet Union applied to take part in the Uruguay Round
negotiations of the GATT as an observer with the intention of becoming a full
member.  The United States and other Western industrialized countries opposed the
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purposes. The Soviet Union sought observer status once before in 1982.  Kennedy, Kevin
C, The Accession of the Soviet Union to the GATT, Journal of World Trade Law,  April
1987, p. 23-39.
5 Russian Economic Trends, October 14, 2002, p. 16; and Goskomstat, Basic Economic and
Social Indicators, [http://www.gks.ru/wps/portal].
6 U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Russia’s Uncertain Economic Future, William
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request because of the Soviet Union’s central planning economic system.4   In 1990,
however, the Soviet Union received observer status to the Uruguay Round
negotiations after GATT signatories, including the United States, concluded that the
Soviet Union was moving toward becoming an open economy under President
Mikhail Gorbachev.   
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia retained the observer
status held by the Soviet Union and, in June 1993, it  formally applied to accede to
the GATT.  On June 16, 1993, the GATT established a working party on Russia’s
accession and, in January 1995, the application was converted to an application to
become a member of the WTO.  
Russian Economic Conditions and Reform: An
Impetus for Joining the WTO
Russia’s motivation for and progress toward accession to the WTO are directly
related to efforts to dismantle the Soviet economic system of central planning and
replace it with a more market-based economy.  President Putin has made entry into
the WTO a top priority, because he sees it as a mechanism for overcoming the
political hurdles that have impeded economic restructuring. The possibility of
accession to the WTO has been an opportunity for him to get some significant
economic reform legislation through the Russian parliament.  Many Russian and
foreign experts have argued that these reforms and more are necessary if Russia  is
to achieve long-term economic growth and development.  At the same time, a
number of economic interest groups that favor the status-quo, such as agriculture, the
auto industry, and raw material producers, have fought against economic reforms and
oppose Russian accession to the WTO.  
Domestic Economic Conditions
Russia has enjoyed economic growth (measured in annual changes in GDP)
since 1999.  Russian GDP increased 5.4%in 1999, 9.1% in 2000, and 5.0% in 2001,
and 5.3% rate in 2002.5  But the growth occurred after a long period of economic
stagnation during the final years of the Soviet Union and a deep recession/depression
during the 1990s.  According to one estimate, the level of Russian GDP in 2000 was
still 21% below its level of 1992.6  Many specialists have attributed the economic
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Cooper, Russia’s Economic Performance:  Entering the 21st Century, 107th Congress, 1st
sess. S. Prt. 107-60, p. 6.   
7  Calculations based on data found in Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Russia,
March 2003,  p. 5.
8  CRS calculations based on data in IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, September 2002,
p. 216.
9  Slay, p. 34; and EIU, Country Profile, Russia, March 2003, p. 33.
10  IMF, International Financial Statistics, May 2003, p. 922.
growth to the depreciation of the ruble and to the rise in world energy prices at the
end of the 1990s.  
However, Russia has been plagued by economic problems including a high
poverty rate and poor health conditions. In addition, economic growth has taken place
unevenly throughout the country with the major cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg
and regions well-endowed with marketable natural resources accounting for most of
the economic growth, while less fortunate regions remained stagnant or have become
poorer.  Moreover,  income distribution among the Russian population has become
increasingly unequal as a small portion of the population acquires larger shares of
wealth.
Russian Foreign Trade, Investment, and Debt
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy has become  more
open to the rest of the world.  The role of foreign trade in the Russian economy has
grown.  By 2002, Russian exports were equivalent to 30.6% GDP and imports were
equivalent to 17.5% of GDP.7  Russian foreign trade has become more
geographically diverse.  By 2002, most of Russian foreign trade took place outside
the former Soviet Union — only 15% of Russian exports and 22% of Russian
imports were with former Soviet states.8
However, the commodity composition of Russian export markets has become
less diverse.  Russia is increasingly dependent on exports of fuels and raw materials.
In 2002, fuels, including crude oil and natural gas, made up 54.6% of Russian
exports, an increase from 40% in 1993.  In 2002, machinery and equipment made up
only 9.5% of Russian exports, a decrease from 14% in 1993.9  This trend indicates
that Russia’s manufacturing sector has not been able to achieve global
competitiveness to date. Therefore, Russia has been reluctant to make commitments
in the WTO accession negotiations that would further expose its manufacturing
sector to global competition. 
Russia has enjoyed sizeable foreign trade surpluses over the past few years
largely because of the rise in the value of Russian fuel exports resulting from higher
world fuel prices and because of the import-substitution driven by the ruble
devaluation after 1998. Russia had a current account surplus of $35.0 billion in 2001
and a  surplus of $32.8 billion in 2002.10 
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Russia’s record on the capital account side of the balance of payments has not
been as stellar.  From 1991 through 2003, only about  $26.1 billion in foreign direct
investment flowed into Russia.  At the same time, $2.8 billion in foreign direct
investments flowed out of Russia to other countries.11  In contrast, in one year alone
(2001), $44.2 billion in foreign direct investment flowed into China.12 Russia is
substantially behind other former Communist states, such as Hungary, Poland, and
the Czech Republic in terms of foreign direct investments on a per capita basis and
is even behind such former and poor Soviet states as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Kazakhstan.13
Russia also has a huge volume of foreign debt.  At the end of 2002, Russia’s
foreign debt totaled $153 billion, $62 billion of which was leftover from the Soviet
Union.  However, Russia’s budget surpluses and strong foreign reserve position have
allowed it to pay down the debt to $147 billion in 2002 from $175 billion in 1999.14
Russian Economic Policy and Restructuring
Russia’s transition from central planning was bound to be more difficult and
longer than that of the Central and East European states.  The communist system was
much more entrenched in the Soviet Union than it was in the rest of the Soviet Bloc.
Furthermore, Russia does not have a legacy of a market economy to draw on as is the
case with some of the Central and East European countries. Russia has had to deal
with the legacy of a Soviet economy that was administered to meet the needs of the
military while civilian production and investment were given low priority.
However, Russia’s economic problems also were the result of policy failures
during the transition.   These failures included loose monetary and fiscal policies
early in the transition period.  They have also included structural problems such as
poorly developed and executed privatization programs that have left many potentially
productive assets in the control of enterprise mangers from the Soviet period or in the
hands of a few politically-connected individuals (“oligarchs”) who extracted the
value from many of these assets rather than making them commercially viable for the
long run.  In addition, an inefficient banking system, the lack of private land
ownership protection, the absence of adequate commercial laws, and an inefficient
and corrupt government bureaucracy have inhibited economic growth and
development.
Despite the setbacks, Russia has made some important strides:
! The government has eliminated price controls on most goods and
services.  This reform has been important because it allows the
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market forces of supply and demand to guide producers and
consumers on purchasing, production and investment.  Controls
have remained on some important items, such as energy, housing,
and transportation, but these, too, are  to be removed eventually. 
! The structure of Russian production more closely resembles that of
an open economy than of a militarized economy.  For example, the
services sector, once a minor part of Soviet economy,  has emerged
in the post-Soviet Russian economy  and  now accounts for more
than half of national output.
! The private sector has grown and accounts for roughly 3/4 of national
output.
Since  taking the reins of power, President Putin has forced Russia into a new
phase of economic reform. Putin has enjoyed a high degree of popularity among the
Russian people that has translated into overwhelming political clout in the Russian
parliament.  In addition, the continuing period of economic growth has provided a
window of opportunity for Putin and  his government to tackle economic
restructuring.  He has been able to push important economic legislation through the
Russian parliament:  tax reform; land reform; reform of government bureaucracy to
make it more responsive to the needs of the economy rather than an impediment to
development and growth; judicial reform; and improvement in corporate governance,
especially the protection of minority shareholders’ rights. 
Still, the fragile basis of Russia’s economic growth strongly suggests that Russia
has far to go in economic reform.  Analysts point to Russia’s weak and
underdeveloped financial sector, poorly developed system of commercial laws, and
confusion over federal vs. regional and local responsibilities in important economic
policy areas.  Furthermore, even though Russian laws have been passed to restructure
the economy, the success of their implementation remains to be seen. With
parliamentary elections coming in December 2003, and with President Putin up for
re-election in 2004, many observers question whether the Kremlin will push
politically difficult reforms whose immediate costs could be substantial and whose
benefits might be realized only in the long-run. 
Russia’s Foreign Trade and Investment Regimes and Policies
In determining the terms and conditions for Russia’s accession to the WTO,
WP members scrutinize Russia’s foreign trade and investment regimes and policies
to ascertain to what degree they conform to WTO rules and where Russia needs to
change.  Russia has made significant strides in that regard.  It eliminated two
important pillars of Soviet central planning in  November 1991,  the state monopoly
on foreign trade and the ban on foreign investment in the Russian economy.
In October 1992,  another legacy of central planning was eliminated  when the
Russian ruble was made convertible into foreign currencies and multiple exchange
rates were eliminated.  A dual exchange rate was briefly introduced in January 1999
as a result of the August 1998 financial crisis but was eliminated in June 1999.  In the
early to mid-1990s, the Central Bank imposed fixed or pegged exchange rates in an
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over foreigner traders in  license approval process.  Ibid. p. 19-23.
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attempt to control ruble depreciation.   Since the August 1998 crisis, the ruble has
been allowed to float but the Central Bank of Russia intervenes by buying or selling
rubles.  The ruble has remained relatively stable since 1999.
In 1992, the Russian government adopted the Harmonized Tariff System that
is used by WTO members,  and it maintains a system of two-column tariff rates —
MFN and non-MFN tariff rates.  Tariff rates on non-agricultural products range from
0 to 30%.  Some countries receive tariff advantages under Russia’s Generalized
System of Preferences(GSP) program in the form of tariff rates that are 25% below
the MFN rate.  A tariff-rate quota is applied to imports of sugar from countries
receiving Russian GSP treatment.15   Of the more than 11,000 commodity categories
in the Russian tariff tables, only fifty have tariff rates above 30%.  
Over time, the Russian government has lowered tariff rates.  In 1995, the trade-
weighted average tariff rate  was 16.0%;  by 2001 it was 11.1%.16   Most products can
be traded without restrictions, but the government requires exports and imports of
some products, for example, pharmaceuticals, alcoholic beverages, precious metals
and stones, to be licensed.17  Russia also applies export tariffs on oil to ensure that
domestic oil supplies are adequate and to compensate for the large differential
between domestic and export oil prices.  In 1998, the Russian government passed
laws to provide for antidumping, countervailing, and safeguards measures against
imports.  Legislation is pending in the Russian parliament to revise them. 
The Status of the Accession Process and
Outstanding Issues
In early 1995,  Russia submitted  to the working party(WP)  the “Memorandum
on the Foreign Trade Regime” which describes the structure of its foreign trade
regime and also the structure, policies, and practices of its economy that would likely
affect its conduct of trade.18  Subsequently, the WP members submitted questions
based on the memorandum, to which the Russian delegation replied.  The process of
submitting the original description of the trade regime, followed by a series of
questions and replies established a benchmark on which the negotiations to determine
the terms and conditions of Russia’s accession would be based.  The initial series of
questions, replies and follow-up responses indicated strong concerns by the WP
members in a broad range of areas including privatization, property rights, price
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controls, government financial support for business, and the structure and
implementation of the tax regime.19  
The Russian accession process is now at a critical stage.  As with most
negotiations, however, the last stages are the most difficult because negotiators now
face the most contentious issues.20  In November 2002, the WP released a draft report
of the negotiations that indicates areas of agreement and bracketed text that indicates
areas of continuing disagreement.  According to the draft report and other reports of
the negotiations, the United States, the European Union, and other participants have
strong reservations about Russian policies and practices on intellectual property
rights, energy pricing, agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, trade in
services, civil aircraft, and  other issues.  Russia’s accession to the WTO will likely
hinge on the resolution of these issues, which are examined below in more detail.
Energy Pricing  
The energy sector dominates the Russian economy.  Not only do oil, natural gas,
and electricity drive industry and provide heat to residents, but energy is also the
largest  Russian export and hard currency earner.  The current structure of Russia’s
energy sector is largely a legacy of the Soviet Union.   The oil industry has been
broken up into several privatized companies.  Natural gas and electricity are largely
monopolies run by Gazprom and United Energy Systems (UES), respectively, which
are joint-stock companies with significant government ownership. The structures of
these companies are now the subject of reform, but that process has proved politically
controversial and therefore slow.
Domestic prices for Russian energy are regulated by the government while
exports of energy products command world prices.  Domestic prices are lower than
world prices, in some cases significantly.   The EU and the United States have
pointed out  that the gap between the world price for natural gas and the Russian
domestic price has been as large as six to one, for electricity — five to one, and for
oil   — four to one.21   The “dual pricing” is partially a result of a policy of providing
affordable heating and electricity to residential customers regardless of ability to pay
and providing favorable fuels rates to enterprises and to government agencies, such
as the military. 22    
Some WP members,  particularly the EU, and to a lesser extent the United
States, have raised concern that dual energy pricing gives Russian manufacturers an
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unfair competitive advantage and would be illegal under the WTO subsidy
agreement.23  
WTO disciplines regarding subsidies are contained in the “Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.”  Under the agreement, a subsidy is
actionable only if it is a “specific subsidy,” that is, it is a subsidy that is available only
to an enterprise, an industry, a group of enterprises or industries in the country that
gives the subsidy.  The agreement defines three kinds of subsidies:
! Prohibited subsidies are ones that distort international trade, for
example, subsidies that require recipients to meet exports targets or
to use domestic products.  These subsidies must be eliminated;
otherwise, the country that complains about them can take
countermeasures. 
! Actionable subsidies are not prohibited unless it is determined that
the subsidy causes injury.  If such a determination is made, then the
complaining country can impose a countervailing duty.
! Non-actionable subsidies are non-specific, or are specific subsidies
for industrial research or development activity, for assistance to
disadvantaged regions, or for adapting existing facilities to new
environmental laws or regulations.  They cannot be challenged in the
WTO.24
    
European and U.S. fertilizer producers have been strong opponents of Russia’s
energy pricing policies because natural gas is a significant input in fertilizer
production, accounting for 3/4 of the final price, according to one estimate.25  The
Russian government and Russian delegates to the WTO negotiations have strongly
argued that Russian energy prices are not an actionable subsidy under WTO rules
because they are available to all industries.  They assert furthermore,  that Russia’s
domestic energy prices reflect its comparative advantage in energy production.  To
date the dual energy pricing issue is still a huge roadblock, especially for the EU, in
Russia’s accession to the WTO. 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection
WTO members are calling on Russia to be in full compliance with the WTO
agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) at the time
of its accession, in terms of laws in place and enforcement.  All WTO members are
bound by the provisions of the TRIPS agreement, which was designed and ratified
to introduce predictability and order to intellectual property rights (IPR) protection
in all WTO members,  because it has become an important factor in international
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trade.  The TRIPS agreement requires WTO members to apply the fundamental
principles of national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment in intellectual
property rights protection.  The agreement also requires WTO members to ensure
protection of copyrights, trademarks, geographical indicators of products, and patents
by imposing and enforcing appropriate laws.26  
Russia has passed a number of laws on IPR protection and is a member of the
major multilateral intellectual property rights conventions.  Russia has committed to
IPR protection in bilateral agreements with the United States and other trading
partners.  However, foreign investor and exporters have complained that the Russian
government has not adequately enforced its laws allowing intellectual property piracy
to continue and grow with impunity — culprits are either not caught, or if caught they
are not punished.27
U.S. producers of copyrighted material have cited unauthorized Russian
reproduction of American-made films, videos, sound recordings, books, and
computer software as a source of lost revenues.  Recently, Russian production of
pirated DVDs has increased  and has been a special source of concern.  Losses due
to intellectual piracy of U.S. products in Russia in 2002 are estimated at $755.8
million dollars.28  The production of counterfeit American products has become so
large that they now make up the vast majority of Russian purchases of these
products.29 Russia has argued that its enforcement of intellectual property rights is
improving, and that it should not be singled out since intellectual piracy continues to
take place in WTO member countries.  IPR protection is of serious concern to the
U.S. Congress.  The House passed (421-2) and the Senate passed (voice vote) on
November 16 and December 22, 2005, respectively, H.Con.Res. 230, calling on
Russia to improve enforcement of IPR or face removal of its benefits under the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. 
Agriculture
Agriculture has been a sensitive part of the economy throughout Russian/Soviet
history.  Its political importance far outweighs its share of the Russian economy
(7.2% of Russian GDP in 2001).30  Agriculture has been severely affected by the
transition to a market economy as much as, or more than, any other sector of  the
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economy. According to one estimate, agricultural production declined around  40%
in volume terms since 1991, much of the decline occurring in  livestock production.31
Several factors have contributed to the downturn.  One factor is Soviet
agriculture policy.  The Soviet government determined what and how much the
economy should produce and directed resources accordingly.  In the 1960s, the
government decided that the Soviet people should eat more meat, and it subsidized
animal feed production and imports of animal feed to fulfill this objective.  The
government set meat prices at a low level to make it affordable to consumers.
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,  market prices were instituted and
state subsidies were dramatically cut, increasing the cost of meat production.32
Furthermore, when the Russian government liberalized trade, Russian producers of
poultry and other meats could not compete with foreign producers who could sell
them more  cheaply. While the Russian federal government has cut support, local and
regional governments have continued to provide assistance in the form of equipment,
favorable credits, and export subsidies.  They are concerned about food security and
unemployment and about maintaining the supply of housing, education, and other
services that state farms provided to the rural communities during the Soviet period
and continue to provide.  
A second factor contributing to the decline in agricultural production has been
the slow pace of restructuring of Russian farms.  Despite the introduction of
privatization, the vast majority of former state and collective farms remain intact as
joint stock operations or cooperatives and operate in virtually the same inefficient
manner as they did under the Soviet government. 
The Russian federal government is under pressure from regional and local
governments and from factions within the Russian parliament to protect agriculture
from further erosion and to provide time and resources to permit it to become
competitive.  This pressure has translated into a difference in positions in the
accession negotiations between Russia and agricultural exporting countries including
the United States, Canada, and Australia over the level and longevity of government
support to agriculture.  The Russian government has argued for higher levels and
longer phase-out periods for supports than its negotiating partners are willing to
accept.   Russian negotiators have also asserted that it should not be required to bind
itself to dramatically lower support levels during the accession process while other
WTO members are currently in the process of negotiating the agriculture subsidies
in the current round of WTO negotiations, Doha Development Agenda (DDA).  The
WTO members have argued that the subsidies that Russia wants to maintain distort
trade and are concerned that they give Russian agriculture producers an unfair
advantage. The Russian side has argued that without government support, Russian
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agriculture could not compete with EU and U.S. agriculture, both of which receive
sizeable government subsidies.33
Another controversy in agriculture  has emerged over Russia’s recent decision
to restrict meat imports.  On January 23, 2003, the Russian government announced
it would impose a three-year quota on poultry imports effective May 1, 2003.  At the
same time the government announced tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on imports of beef
and pork effective April 1, 2003, and to remain in effect until 2010.34   Meat
exporting WTO member- countries, including the United States, Canada, Argentina,
Australia, and New Zealand,  have expressed stiff opposition, claiming that the
restrictions may retard the process of Russia’s accession to the WTO.  They
specifically argue that Russia has violated the “standstill” principle under which
countries applying for WTO membership are to refrain from imposing new trade
restrictions during the accession process.  Russia counters that it is imposing the
restrictions to protect its domestic meat producers from import surges, a right that is
enjoyed by WTO members.35
During the Uruguay Round, WTO members agreed to expand disciplines over
trade in agricultural products, and agricultural trade is on the agenda of the current
round, the DDA.  Under the Agricultural Agreement all WTO members, except least
developed countries, are committed to reduce tariffs and subsidies on the  production
and export of agricultural goods.36   
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations  
Some WP members have raised concerns over Russia’s sanitary and
phytosanitary (SPS) standards, that is standards and certification procedures that
determine the safety of meats and other animal products, plants, and plant products.
They argue that these procedures are not scientifically based and discriminate against
imports thus violating WTO rules. Under the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPM), WTO members are permitted to apply controls on
products in order to protect public health and safety,  but those controls must be
scientifically based and must not discriminate against imports.37  Russia has argued
that its SPS controls meet the requirements of the SPM agreement. 
The United States has expressed particular concern about this issue. In March
2002, the Russian government imposed a ban on imports of U.S. poultry because of
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(continued...)
the possible presence of avian influenza.  Russia had become the largest market for
U.S. exports of chicken.  After months of negotiations,  the United States and Russia
agreed in August 2002 on a new veterinary certificate for U.S. poultry that would
include inspections by Russian veterinarians of U.S. processing and storage facilities,
but technical issues remained that prevented the process from being implemented. 
On April 3, 2003, the two sides announced the resolution of the problems, allowing
the inspection of the facilities to go forward and U.S. poultry exports to resume.38
Nevertheless, the United States is concerned that  Russia would impose similar
restrictions in the future and has pressed Russia to adhere to the WTO requirements
as part of  the conditions of its accession.  
Services
Services, especially financial services (banking, insurance, and securities), are
a relatively new phenomenon in the Russian economy.  Under the Soviet Union,
services were government-owned and operated and were confined to personal
services (for example, lodging, hair salons, restaurants).  They were not well
developed because they were not a government priority.  Financial services were
virtually non-existent in the Soviet Union because their function as intermediaries
between savers and borrowers of capital had no role in the Soviet planned economy.
The services sector has grown rapidly during Russia’s transition to a market
economy but has not matured in most cases.  The United States, the EU, and other
advanced developed WTO members have argued that Russia needs an efficient
financial services industry to promote economic growth and development and that
opening the industry to foreign investment would introduce expertise and new
capital.
Russian officials and business representatives claim that their service industries
must have government protection as “infant industries,” because they are too
immature and would be wiped out if they had to face foreign competition too soon.
An example is the fledgling Russian insurance industry.  Private insurance companies
have been developing since the government monopoly was removed after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, but not sufficiently to meet demand.  Foreign insurance
companies that could help fill the gap and bring expertise and a wide range of
products are restricted.  For example, the government: limits total foreign
capitalization to 15% of the domestic insurance industry; requires the general director
and the chief accountant to be Russian citizens; restricts participation to foreign
companies that have been in business no less than 15 years in their home country;
and requires that foreign insurance companies operate as a minority shareholder in
a Russian insurance company before they can be granted their own license.   In
addition, foreign providers are  prohibited from underwriting and reinsuring
mandatory insurance — auto and health insurance and insurance taken out by
government entities — the fastest growing insurance market in Russia.39  Russian
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negotiators assert that those restrictions should remain while U.S., EU, and other
working party participants want them loosened or removed. 
The Russian banking sector is similarly underdeveloped.  About 30% of the
volume of Russian banking activity is conducted by two banks — Sberbank and
Vneshtorgbank, both of which are owned by the Central Bank of Russia.   Sberbank
holds roughly 70% of the Russian savings deposits.  Foreign participation in the
banking sector is restricted by government laws and regulations.  Foreign banks  may
operate in Russia only as subsidiaries and not as branches of the parent bank.
Foreign banks have cited the lack of an effective deposit insurance program as a
disincentive for new, private banks to develop.  The government in effect backs
deposits of Sberbank 100%.40  Russian negotiators claim that the government will
establish a deposit insurance program for deposits in all banks but argues that the
limit on foreign participation in Russian banking must be maintained to allow
domestic banks to become competitive.41  U.S. negotiators and negotiators from some
of the other working party countries are requesting that Russia liberalize its banking
sector to increase foreign participation, arguing that the foreign influence would
increase, not undermine, the competitiveness of Russian banks by promoting stability
and popular confidence.  Furthermore, a liberalized banking sector would likely boost
other sectors of the economy.
In telecommunications, Russia permits 100% foreign ownership of
telecommunication services providers, but it has requested to be bound by a
commitment of only  49% foreign ownership. U.S. and EU negotiators oppose such
a ceiling because they view the Russian telecommunications market as potentially
lucrative for its firms.  The Russian government has also indicated it wants long
distance and international telephone communications to remain in the control of a
monopoly, Rostelcom, until 2010.42
WTO rules on trade in services, including financial services, are contained in
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which was agreed to during the
Uruguay Round.  In general, the GATS is designed to apply internationally accepted
rules, such as most-favored-nation treatment, to trade in services that are similar to
those applied to trade in goods.  In important respects, however, the GATS is less
comprehensive than the GATT.  For example, WTO rules on goods trade contained
in the GATT apply to all goods, but many of the rules, contained in the GATS,
including, “national treatment,” apply only to those services and the modes of
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delivery of those services on which that the member country has identified in its
schedule of commitments.  
    
Civil Aircraft
 Russian aircraft manufacturers, as the case with the Russian defense-related
industries in general,  have seen demand for their production plummet after the
government dramatically cut defense expenditures and after airlines from former
Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
shifted to European and U.S. manufacturers for their aircraft.  The Russian
government wants to protect domestic aircraft manufacturers from further erosion of
business.  It imposes a 20% ad valorem tariff on imported aircraft.   Russia argues
that its aircraft industry is operating at only 0-15% of capacity and is in great need of
modernization.  For it to become competitive, it needs to be protected from foreign
competition and therefore must apply high tariffs to imported aircraft.  The United
States and EU are pressing Russia to sign on to the plurilateral WTO Civil Aircraft
Agreement (CAA) (only 26 members are currently signatories) which commits the
signatories to eliminate  tariffs on trade in civil aircraft and some related equipment.
In an 1996 bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with the United States, Russia
stated that it would sign the CAA but has backed off that commitment during the
accession negotiations.  Because its is a plurilateral agreement, a WTO member is not
required to sign the CAA as part of its obligations.
Russia does grant some tariff waivers to allow domestic airlines to fulfill needs
that cannot be accommodated by domestically manufactured aircraft.   It has recently
favored the European firm, Airbus Industries in granting those waivers. The United
States has demanded that the waivers should be granted without favoring any
particular company.43
Other Issues
In addition to the above issues, the United States, the EU, and other working
party members have raised other issues about Russia’s trade and foreign investment
regime and want Russia to make changes as part of the conditions for its accession
to the WTO.  They include:
! Tariffs: The Russian government has lowered tariffs on most
categories of products in the tariff schedule.  Nevertheless, it
maintains high tariffs on some items to protect fledgling industries
from foreign competition.  High tariffs on autos, for example, have
been a concern of U.S. manufacturers.   Tariffs and excise taxes (that
vary depending on the engine displacement) can add over 70% to the
delivery cost of an imported new car.  The Russian government also
recently increased tariffs on used vehicles that are 3-7 years of age
because they compete with Russian domestically produced new
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cars.44   U.S., Japanese, and Korean delegations want Russia to lower
tariffs on autos.45 The Russian government asserts that the fledgling
domestic auto industry requires some temporary protection from
more developed foreign producers in order to become competitive.
 
! Customs regulations: Some WP members have argued that the
implementation of federal customs regulations is inconsistent,
leading to confusion and inhibiting trade.  Some also raised
problems with the policy of restricting trade of certain goods to
specific ports, making it difficult for imported products to be
delivered to customers.  Legislation establishing a new customs code
is pending in the parliament. 
! Import licensing:  The Russian government requires import licenses
on  certain products:  pharmaceuticals, sugar (to implement a tariff-
rate quota on sugar imported under Russia’s Generalized System of
Preferences program), precious metals and stones, and alcoholic
beverages.  Some WP members have expressed concern that Russia
might impose additional licensing requirements that would further
impede imports and are asking Russia to commit to removing import
restrictions and not impose new ones that are not consistent with
WTO requirements.  Legislation to simplify the import licensing
procedures is pending in the parliament.
! Government procurement: WP members have requested that
Russia join the plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement
which commits signatories to open contracts for government
purchases to bids from other signatory countries. 
U.S.-Russian Economic Ties and WTO Accession
The United States has strongly supported Russia’s accession to the WTO since
Russia first applied to join the GATT in 1993.  Most recently, President Bush
reiterated U.S. support just prior to his June 1, 2003 summit meeting with Putin in
St. Petersburg.46   The U.S. government has provided advice to the Russian
government on how to make its trade and investment regime WTO compatible and
to educate Russian firms on the implications of WTO accession.  Because the United
States is the world’s largest economy, its support is critical to the success of Russia’s
application. However, the United States has also insisted that Russia enter the WTO
on “commercial terms,” that is, on terms that do not distort trade, and that Russia
immediately adhere to WTO agreements upon accession.
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U.S. support for Russian accession is just one part of post-Cold War U.S. trade
and economic policy that has encouraged Russian endeavors to establish a market
economy.   And the trade and economic policy is itself part of a larger U.S. foreign
policy strategy to anchor Russia in the world community and to reshape the U.S.-
Russian relationship into one of cooperation.
U.S. support to Russia  in the trade and investment areas has come in the form
of technical assistance, trade preferences (including  tariff  preferences under the
U.S. GSP program), and financial assistance to U.S. exporters to and investors in
Russia through the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC).  Since 1992, the United States has granted Russia conditional
normal trade relations (NTR), or most-favored-nation (MFN), status, which means
that lower tariffs are applied to imports from Russia than was the case when Russia
did not have NTR status.   
U.S.-Russian trade and investment flows have increased in the post-Cold War
reflecting the changed U.S.-Russian relationship, although they remain lower than
what many observers consider their potential. U.S. imports from Russia have
increased substantially since the end of the Cold War from $0.5 billion in 1992
peaking at $8.6 billion in 2003.  U.S. exports have increased but not as significantly,
from $2.1 billion in 1992 peaking at $3.6 billion in 1998 just before the financial
crisis and  declining to $2.4 billion in 2003.   Since 1994, the United States has
incurred small but growing trade deficits with Russia, peaking at $6.2 billion in 2003.
The large increase in U.S. imports may reflect not so much an increase in the volume
of trade but the rise in world prices of raw materials, particularly oil,  that comprise
the bulk of those imports.  
















1992 2.1 0.5 1.6 1999 2.1 5.9 -3.8
1993 3.0 1.7 1.3 2000 2.1 7.7 -5.6
1994 2.6 3.2 -0.6 2001 2.7 6.3 -3.5
1995 2.8 4.0 -1.2 2002 2.4 6.8  -4.4
1996 3.3 3.6 -0.3 2003 2.4 8.6 -6.2
1997 3.4 4.3 -0.9 2004 3.0 11.9 -8.9
1998 3.6 5.7 -2.1 2005 3.9 15.3 -11.3
Source:  Compiled by CRS from U.S. Department of Commerce Data.  Bureau of the
Census.  FT900.
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Slow Russian economic growth and the rapid depreciation of the ruble after
1998 constrained demand for imports from the United States.  Russia’s limited
export base has constrained U.S. demand for imports from Russia.   In 2004 close to
70% of U.S. imports from Russia consisted of precious metals, inorganic chemicals,
fuels, and aluminum.47
Although the United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment in
Russia,  the level of the investment is far below most expectations and limited in
scope.  U.S. investors accounted for $4.08 billion in foreign direct investment as of
the end of 2001, largely in the transportation, fuel, communications, and engineering
industries.48   
U.S. exporters and investors claim that a number of factors make them cautious
about entering the Russian market:  the lack of adherence to international standards
of accounting; weak enforcement of intellectual property rights; the lack of protection
of share- holders rights; burdensome taxation; and poor legal protection of contract
sanctity.   These concerns are largely mirrored in the demands the United States has
made on Russia during its negotiations in the WTO.
For their part, Russian policymakers have asserted that U.S. trade policy has
also been slow to adjust to the post-Cold War era.  For example, they point out that
the United States only recently removed the “nonmarket economy status” that was
applied in antidumping duty cases against Russian imports.49 Under U.S.
antidumping laws, “fair value” for imports from nonmarket economies is calculated
differently than for imports from other economies.  That methodology leads to higher
dumping margins and antidumping duties and, therefore, placed imports from Russia
at a  competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other imports or U.S. domestic production.
In response to requests from Russian steel producers, the U.S. Department of
Commerce examined the possibility of no longer treating Russia as a nonmarket
economy and removed the designation on June 7, 2002.50  
More critical for Russia has been the U.S. government’s continued application
of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to trade relations with Russia. Russia’s current
conditional NTR status from the United States is governed by Title IV of the Trade
Act of 1974, as amended. Section 401 of Title IV requires the President to continue
to deny NTR status to any country that was not receiving such treatment at the time
of the law’s enactment on January 3, 1975. In effect, this meant all communist
countries, except Poland and Yugoslavia.  Section 402 of Title IV, the Jackson-Vanik
amendment, denies the countries eligibility for NTR status as well as access to U.S.
government credit facilities, such as the Export-Import Bank, as long as the country
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denies its citizens the right of freedom-of-emigration. These restrictions can be
removed if the President determines that the country is in full compliance with the
freedom-of-emigration conditions set out under the Jackson-Vanik amendment.  For
a country to retain that status, the President must reconfirm his determination of full
compliance in a semiannual report (by June 30 and December 31) to Congress. His
determination can be overturned by Congress via the enactment of a joint resolution
of disapproval at the time of the December 31 report. 
The Jackson-Vanik amendment also permits the President to waive full
compliance with the free emigration requirement, if he determines that such a waiver
would promote the objectives of the amendment, that is, encourage freedom of
emigration. This waiver authority is subject to an annual renewal by the President and
to congressional disapproval via a joint resolution.  Before a country can receive
NTR treatment under either the presidential determination of full compliance or the
presidential waiver, both the United States and the country in question must have
concluded and enacted a bilateral agreement that provides for, among other things,
reciprocal extension of NTR (or MFN) status. The agreement and a presidential
proclamation extending NTR status cannot go into effect until a joint resolution
approving the agreement is enacted.   In 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union
signed a bilateral trade agreement. The agreement was subsequently applied to each
of the former Soviet states. The United States first granted  NTR treatment to Russia
under the presidential waiver authority beginning in June 1992 and, since September
1994, under the full compliance provision. Presidential extensions of NTR status to
Russia have met with virtually no congressional opposition.
 
Russian political leaders have continually pressed the United States to
“graduate” Russia from Jackson-Vanik coverage entirely. They see the amendment
as a Cold War relic that does not reflect Russia’s new stature as a fledgling
democracy and market economy.  Moreover, Russian leaders argue that Russia has
implemented freedom-of-emigration policies since the fall of the communist
government, making the Jackson-Vanik conditions inappropriate and unnecessary.
While Russia remains subject to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, some of the
other former Soviet republics have been granted permanent and unconditional NTR-
Kyrgyzstan on June 29, 2000, and Georgia on December 29, 2000.   Perhaps, what
has particularly irked Russian leaders is that on  January 1, 2002, the United States
granted permanent and unconditional NTR status to China, which is ostensibly still
a communist country. 
Granting Russia permanent and unconditional NTR status will have little direct
impact on U.S.-Russian trade, since Russian imports have entered the United States
on a NTR basis since 1992. The initiative would be a political symbol of Russia’s
treatment as a “normal” country in U.S. trade, further distancing U.S.-Russian
relations from the Cold War.  For investors and other business people, permanent
NTR (PNTR) may mean a more stable climate for doing business. But many
observers have concluded that U.S.-Russian economic ties will grow only when
Russia has undertaken sufficient economic reforms to improve the climate for trade
and investment.
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It has a direct bearing on the WTO accession issue since the WTO requires its
members to extend mutual unconditional MFN status to one another’s exports.  If the
United States does not extend permanent NTR to Russia, the United States would not
benefit from the concessions, except tariff reductions, that Russia makes upon
acceding to the WTO.
Implications of Russia’s Accession to the WTO
Because the major trade powers — the United States, the EU, and Japan —
strongly support Russia’s entry into the WTO, the pending question is not whether
Russia will accede but when.  The answer to that question depends on when Russia
and the more than sixty members of the working party can finish hammering out the
conditions of accession.  Negotiators have reportedly reached agreement on most
issues, but disagreements on difficult issues of energy pricing, agriculture, services,
civil aircraft, and intellectual property rights, have slowed down the process and the
original goal of accession by the September 2003 WTO Ministerial Meeting in
Cancun, Mexico unattainable.  Several other desired deadlines have passed.  There
are indications that the United States and Russia would like to see the process
completed by July 2006, when Russia chairs the G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg.
Implications for Russia
The stakes for Russia in joining the WTO are high.  Russia’s political
leadership, led by Putin, has  made a commitment to join the WTO.    In his April 18,
2002 address to the Federal Assembly, the bicameral Russian legislature, Putin
underscored his administration’s priority to get Russia into the WTO.  In the speech,
Putin emphasized the need for the Russian government to establish the conditions to
improve the economic well-being of the Russian people and linked that effort with
joining the WTO:
Tight competition is a norm in the international community and in the modern
world, competition for markets, investments, economic and political influence.
Russia must be strong and competitive in this fight.
The world market is already here and our market has become part of the system...
The WTO is an instrument.  He who knows how to use it grows stronger; he who
prefers to sit behind a fence of protectionist quotas, and duties — he is doomed,
absolutely doomed strategically.
Our country is still excluded from the process of making world trade rules.  We
are already in the world trade but we have no say in shaping the rules of trade.
This tends to stunt the Russian economy and make it less competitive.51
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In acceding to the WTO, Russia is making a legally binding commitment to
conform to WTO rules.  In so doing, it agrees to make its foreign trade and
investment regimes open to the scrutiny of  the WTO and its members.  At the same
time, the WTO provides a multilateral forum for Russia to settle trade disputes with
other WTO members.  As a WTO member, Russia will  have a voice in how those
rules are made and implemented.  It would be a major step in integrating Russia
within the international trade system.
But before it can accede to the WTO, Russia must satisfy WTO members that
it is ready to meet its obligations.  The working party negotiations and the bilateral
negotiations to date suggest that those countries are not satisfied and require that
Russia make major adjustments in policies and regulations.
The adjustments include reviewing and possibly changing more than 100
Russian laws and reviewing more than 1,000 international agreements that Russia has
with various countries.52  However, the overall impact of WTO accession on Russia
will depend on the terms and conditions of  accession that Russian and its trading
partners in the WTO finally agree on.  In general, Russia will likely have to reduce
tariffs and other protective measures for  import-sensitive industries such as autos
and aircraft and will have to open up key financial service industries — banking and
insurance — to foreign competition.  In the short run, such adjustments could lead
to the loss of jobs in those areas and the need for the Russian government to provide
unemployment insurance and other adjustment assistance.  
However, globally competitive industries, such as the raw material producers,
could see markets abroad opening up and an increase in foreign investment as
accession forces Russia to restructure its economy.  In the long run, mainstream
economic theory and the record of economies that have gone through similar
transitions suggest that trade liberalization will lead to a more efficient Russian
economy and to raising the living standard of the average Russian citizen.53  New
industries will probably emerge over time helping to diversify the Russian economy.
The Russian business community is divided on the issue of accession.  Some
have expressed skepticism if not out right opposition to accession.  Among this group
is Oleg Deripaska, an influential and powerful  aluminum and auto business magnate.
He is concerned that WTO accession will force Russia to eliminate protection and
that the domestic auto industry will face competition from U.S., European, and
Japanese manufacturers.  He is also concerned that Russia would have to charge
higher prices for energy, a major input in aluminum production. Similarly,
representatives of  aviation, furniture, financial services, telecommunications, and
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agriculture have asserted that Russia stands to lose more than it will gain from
accession because Russia has not matured sufficiently to meet the competition.54
On the other hand, the Russian “oligarchs” (business magnates) who control
industries that can compete on world markets, support accession.  Among them is
Mikhail Khodorkovsky who controls the Yukos oil company.  He claims  that
accession will open foreign markets and make Russia more attractive to foreign
investment.  In addition to Khodorkovsky, the Russian Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs, a group that includes many Russian business leaders, has supported
accession.55
Views on accession cut across regions with support coming from regional
political leaders in the major business centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg and in
regions where raw material production is located.  Political leaders in regions where
fledgling import-sensitive manufacturers are located have been skeptical or opposed
to accession.  For most Russians, accession has not attracted much interest.56  
Putin and the current Russian political leadership have made economic growth
and development their highest priority and they view Russia’s admission into the
WTO as an essential part of the strategy to fulfill those goals.  Putin appears to view
the accession process as a way of forcing the government bureaucracy, the Duma,
and Russian industry to confront the changes that are required if Russia is to attain
long-term sustainable economic growth and development.  While Putin’s political
future probably does not depend directly on whether Russia gets into the WTO, it
will likely be evaluated on the basis to what degree economic life in Russia has
improved.
WTO accession would be a further sign of Russia’s acceptance and participation
in the major multilateral economic institutions:  the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund;  and the G-8.  In so doing, Russia would distance itself further from
its Soviet past.
Implications for the United States
For U.S. exporters and investors, Russia’s accession to the WTO may improve
the business climate in Russia which has been unpredictable.  The U.S. business
community often cites poor intellectual property rights protection, inconsistent and
opaque customs regulations, inconsistent enforcement of the regulations, and
irrational SPS and technical trade barriers as among the impediments to trade and
investment.  Accession could bring more stability and openness in the business
climate since Russia would have to adhere to WTO rules that promote these
conditions.
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The volume of U.S. imports from Russia has been low primarily because
Russia’s limited export-base.  Nevertheless, some U.S. import-sensitive industries,
for example steel, may face increased competition from Russian producers. These
industries may press U.S. negotiators  to include as part of the terms and conditions
for Russia’s accession, a special safeguard provision, beyond  that provided in the
WTO agreements, that would cushion the potentially adverse impact of a large
increase in Russian imports upon accession.  Such a provision was included in the
conditions for China’s accession to the WTO and was codified in U.S. law as section
421 of the Trade Act of 1974.   
Similar to section 201 (escape clause) provision of the Trade Act of 1974,
section 421 allows the United States to temporarily restrict fairly traded imports that
cause or threaten to cause injury to the domestic injury. Unlike section 201, however,
section 421 permits the restrictions to be applied solely  to imports of like products
from China, rather than requiring them to be applied on an MFN basis on imports of
like products from all countries.  In addition, the required  thresholds of cause and
level of  injury to the domestic industry for relief under section 421 is lower than
under section 201.  Section 201 requires that imports be a “substantial” cause of
“serious injury,” whereas section 421 requires only that the imports be a “significant
cause” of “material injury.”  For many in the U.S. business and agricultural
community, the issue is not whether Russia should be allowed to join the WTO but
one of  assurance that Russia will enter under conditions that are commercially sound
and will  have minimal negative impact on U.S. industries.  
Implications for Other Countries and the WTO
Russia is the largest and most populous country that is not a member of the
WTO.  If Russia accedes, it would significantly expand the geographical coverage
of WTO rules to all major economies leading to a larger degree of stability and
transparency to the international trading system. 
At the same time, Russia’s entry into the WTO would continue a trend in which
as the membership of the WTO becomes larger and more diverse, it becomes more
difficult for that membership to reach a consensus on important issues.  In addition,
trade disputes between Russia and its trading partners will be brought to the WTO
for resolution rather than  addressed bilaterally, adding to the ever growing caseload
of the WTO. 
As an economy still in transition, Russia would bring its own perspective to
WTO negotiations.  For example, Russia could be expected to challenge the positions
the United States and other countries have taken in the WTO on the role of subsidies
in trade and the degree to which trade in services should be liberalized. 
